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Since 1996, the Bank of England’s Centre for Central Banking Studies
(CCBS) has published a series of Handbooks in Central Banking. These
books present particular topics that concern central bankers in a concise,
balanced and practical manner.
As financial markets have become increasingly complex, central bankers'
demands for specialised technical assistance and training has risen. This
has been reflected in the content of lectures and presentations given by
CCBS and Bank staff on technical assistance and training courses. In order
to give wider distribution to the material developed in these lectures, we
are introducing this new series of Handbooks: Lecture Series.
The aim of this new series is to give wider exposure to lectures and
presentations that address topical and technically advanced issues of
relevance to central banks. The intention is both to spread ideas and
knowledge and to add to the debate in the particular subject. As always, we
welcome any comments on this Handbook – Lecture Series 1. The views
expressed in the Handbook: Lecture Series are those of the author(s) and
not necessarily those of the Bank of England.
Robert Heath
Series EditorAbstract
This lecture describes the United Kingdom’s experience with inflation
targeting. It provides an historical perspective to the introduction of
inflation targeting, discusses the concept of inflation targets, and compares
an inflation targeting regime with money supply and exchange rate
targeting regimes. It is noteworthy that inflation targeting is based on the
assumption that low inflation is the proper objective of monetary policy.
A significant portion of the lecture covers the issue of the measurement of
inflation. It discusses whether asset prices should be taken into account in
the inflation measure and looks in particular at the experience of Japan in
the late 1980s. It also considers sources of imperfection in traditional
measures. It concludes that monetary policy will have to be conducted by
reference to estimated price indexes that fall short of the conceptual ideal
but does not regard this as seriously undermining an inflation targeting
regime. The lecture goes on to discuss the issues of (1) having a target
band for inflation or not, (2) the difficulty in forecasting inflation, and (3)
the time horizon over which monetary policy should aim.
The lecture highlights the important role that openness and transparency
play in achieving credibility in monetary policy. It highlights the five
devices that are now in use in the United Kingdom, and notes some of the
benefits emerging from the open and transparent nature of the United
Kingdom approach. It concludes by warning that inflation targeting does
not promise to make monetary policy easy but does have the positive virtue
of directing attention to many technical issues that need to be resolved in
conducting monetary policy.INFLATION TARGETING:  THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE
1
Introduction
I would like to describe to you today the experience of the United
Kingdom with inflation targeting, in the hope that you may find it
interesting and perhaps useful.  I will not presume to make any
recommendations about how monetary policy in Korea should be
conducted, but I will discuss some of the issues and topics that you have
very helpfully identified as being of particular interest to you.
Before I start, let me say that I was the Head of the Bank of England’s
Foreign Exchange Division in 1992 when the United Kingdom withdrew
from the European Exchange Rate Mechanism.  That episode was an
experience that I would not want to repeat, but perhaps it means that I can
understand a little of what you must have experienced during your
financial crisis last winter.
The United Kingdom is not the only country to use inflation targeting, nor
did we invent it.  The first country to introduce it was New Zealand in
1989;  other users include Canada, Australia, Israel, Sweden and the Czech
Republic.  The European Central Bank has not yet decided its monetary
policy strategy, but it is likely to incorporate elements of inflation
targeting.  And there has been serious discussion of the possibility of
inflation targeting in the United States.
1 Lecture delivered at the Bank of Korea on 22 September 1998The United Kingdom began inflation targeting in late 1992, and it may be
useful if I begin with some historical background.  After the break-up of
the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s, the United Kingdom had a
floating exchange rate and an unstable but increasing rate of inflation,
which reached over 25% in 1975 (Chart 1).  It became clear that serious
errors had been made in the conduct of monetary policy in the early 1970s,
based on the mistaken belief that there was a stable trade-off between
unemployment and LQIODWLRQ LQRWKHUZRUGVDVWDEOH3KLOOLSVFXUYH
3.  It
also became increasingly widely understood that the control of inflation
was a necessary pre-condition for the achievement of other economic
policy objectives, and therefore had to be assigned top priority among
policy objectives.
2 RPIX is a measure of UK retail price inflation that excludes mortgage interest repayments.
3 The Phillips curve originates from AW Phillips’ 1958 observation of a stable relationship between
unemployment and the rate of change in nominal wages in the UK from 1861–1957.
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year earlierDuring the quarter-century since then, the rate of inflation has been
reduced tenfold, from over 25% to 2½%.  The fall in the rate of inflation
has not been steady or continuous, there have been a number of crises, and
we have used a number of different monetary policy techniques.  Inflation
targeting is the latest of them, adopted after we left the European Exchange
Rate Mechanism in September 1992, and it has been the longest-lasting.  I
should say, however, that our own inflation targeting procedures are still
evolving and that we are learning all the time through experience.  We do
not know all the answers.  In particular, we have no experience of inflation
targeting during a cyclical downturn.
Inflation targeting is based on the assumption that low inflation is the
proper objective of monetary policy.  That assumption is based, in the
United Kingdom, on unhappy experience of trying to pursue other
objectives with monetary policy.  I do not intend to take up time now in
justifying the assumption that price stability should be the proper objective
of monetary policy.  I note, however, that the Bank of Korea is now
required by law to set a price stability target every year in consultation with
the government.
There have been complaints in the United Kingdom that the fact that the
central bank is pursuing an inflation target means that it is not concerned
about output and employment.  That is a misconception, because the
inflation target as currently specified in the UK is symmetrical.  It is just as
serious a policy error for inflation to be below target as it is for it to be
above target, and if inflation is expected to be below target it is the Bank ofEngland’s duty to ease monetary policy.  Moreover, the Bank of England is
required by law to support the Government’s economic policy, including
its objectives for growth and employment, subject to the overriding
objective of maintaining price stability.
I would like now to talk briefly about some general historical experience of
various monetary policy techniques before talking in more detail about
technical aspects of inflation targeting.  Finally, I will say something about
openness and transparency in monetary policy.
Historical experience of monetary policy techniques
Further back in history than the 1970s, it was normal for monetary policy
to be directed at price stability.  The gold standard amounted, in effect, to a
rule for conducting monetary policy so as to achieve stable prices.
Likewise the international monetary system designed at the Bretton Woods
conference in 1944 was a kind of dollar standard, which endured until the
early 1970s, when the tension between the policies that had been pursued
by the United States and the price-stability objectives of other countries
became unsustainable.
After the Bretton Woods system broke down, industrial countries had to
find their own techniques for pursuing low inflation, rather than hoping
and expecting that the job would be done for them by the combination of a
fixed exchange rate against the dollar and successful pursuit of low
inflation by the monetary policy of the United States.For a long time these techniques fell into three groups:
(i)  Regional exchange rate arrangements.  The most important example
in this category is the European Exchange Rate Mechanism, which
developed into a Deutsche Mark bloc, in which the DM is the key
currency (just as the dollar was in the Bretton Woods system) and the
other members pursue monetary policies which are constrained to
follow Germany.  The success of the arrangement has depended on
Germany’s continued success in achieving low inflation; for the other
members their exchange rate against the DM has represented an
intermediate monetary policy objective, the final objective being low
inflation.  The Exchange Rate Mechanism is shortly to be transferred
into the European Single Currency.
(ii)  Monetary targets.  If there is a stable relationship between one or
more monetary aggregates and the general level of prices, then
monetary policy can be directed at a particular rate of growth in the
monetary aggregate (the intermediate objective) compatible with low
inflation.
(iii)  Techniques involving no specified intermediate targets.  Some
countries have succeeded in managing monetary policy without
reference to a specific intermediate target: perhaps the most
conspicuous example is the United States in the last ten years or so.The history of intermediate targets has been mixed.  European exchange
rate developments over the early to mid-1990s were turbulent and a
number of countries, including the United Kingdom, abandoned their
exchange rate pegs.  As to monetary targets, the stable relationships
between monetary aggregates and the price level on which they depend
KDYHLQPDQ\FDVHVEURNHQGRZQ QRWDEO\ZKHQILQDQFLDOPDUNHWVKDYH
been liberalised.  The danger of managing monetary policy without an
intermediate target is that with no clear and explicit objective, policy could
easily become incoherent and produce poor results, though that it not an
accusation that can be made against recent monetary policy in the United
States.
Inflation targets
Inflation targets have in many cases been introduced when some other
monetary policy technique has failed.  For example Canada introduced
them after monetary targets had failed.  To quote the then Governor of the
Bank of &DQDGD ³ZHGLGQ¶WDEDQGRQPRQHWDU\WDUJHWVWKH\DEDQGRQHG
us”.  Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom introduced inflation targets
after abandoning an exchange rate peg.  (Finland has now, in effect, gone
back to a fixed exchange rate by joining the European Single Currency.)
Inflation targets are conceptually different from monetary and exchange
rate targets in one important respect, namely that monetary policy actions
normally affect monetary aggregates and exchange rates more quickly than
they affect inflation.  Indeed, it is widely acknowledged that monetary
policy actions affect inflation only after a long delay, perhaps of two years
or so.  This has two important consequences:(i)  It implies that the public credibility of an inflation target policy
depends not on the achievement of an intermediate target which the
public can monitor continuously and which is thought to be a leading
indicator of future inflation, but rather on the credibility of a promise
to achieve an inflation target in the distant future.  This in turn depends
on whether the public believes that monetary policy will continue to be
directed towards the objective of price stability, and that the objectives
of monetary policy will not be changed.  If I ask myself why an
inflation target was not introduced in the United Kingdom in the
1970s, the answer is perhaps that at that time, the public would not
have believed that monetary policy would continue to be directed
towards meeting the inflation target, because the belief in a long-run
trade-off between inflation and unemployment was still widespread.  A
continuously monitorable target was needed.
(ii) It means that an additional procedure is needed to determine what
monetary policy now is needed to achieve the inflation target in the
future.  The additional procedure in question must, as a matter of logic,
involve a forecast of inflation assuming unchanged monetary policy
and an estimate of how future inflation is likely to be affected by
changes in the current setting of monetary policy instruments (eg
interest rates).  In a sense, the forecast of inflation has the same logical
status in inflation targeting as the monetary aggregate has in monetary
targeting and as the exchange rate has in exchange rate targeting.Some critics have claimed that the fact that inflation targeting is logically
reliant on forecasting represents a weakness of the technique, because
forecasts are inherently unreliable.  That is a misconception.  Any monetary
policy technique has to take account of the fact that policy changes made
now do not affect inflation until some time in the future.  Indeed, most
economic policy instruments have their effect only after a time delay.  As I
just said, inflation targeting requires a forecast of inflation and an estimate
of how inflation is likely to be affected by changes in monetary policy
instruments.  Fundamentally, the pursuit of low inflation by means of any
technique requires the same things.  For example the use of monetary
targets has to be based on an assumption about the relationship between
current monetary growth and future LQIODWLRQ DQG, indeed, if the policy
instrument is interest rates, as it usually is, a further assumption is needed
about the relationship between current interest rates and future monetary
growth.  The difference in this respect between inflationary targeting and
monetary targeting is not that inflation targeting makes forecasts necessary,
but rather that inflation targeting makes the need for forecasts explicit
rather than implicit.  I will say more about forecasting later on.
In practical application there has been less difference between inflation
targeting and monetary targeting than you might imagine.  In Germany, for
example, monetary targeting has been employed for over 20 years and
during that time it has become evident that the assumed relationships
between interest rates and the target monetary aggregate, and between the
target monetary aggregate and inflation, are not completely stable and
predictable.  In practice the Deutsche Bundesbank has acknowledged thisfact in the conduct of monetary policy.  The results have been that
monetary targets have often not been hit, and that actual monetary policy
has perhaps not been very different from what it might have been had an
inflation target been pursued.  Most empirical studies of German monetary
policy support this view.
The differences between inflation targeting and exchange rate targeting are
greater, both in concept and in practice, than the differences between
inflation targeting and monetary targeting.  Of course it is true that
exchange rate targeting makes sense only if there is a predictable
relationship between the exchange rate and future inflation, just as in the
case of monetary targeting.  But not every country can pursue an exchange
rate target, for obvious reasons.  Somewhere there has to be a so-called
anchor currency country which sets a standard by using a different
monetary policy WHFKQLTXH DQG LQ DQ LPSRUWDQW VHQVH FRXQWULHV ZKLFK
target their exchange rates against the anchor currency are borrowing that
country’s monetary policy technique and its monetary policy credibility.
And at the practical level, while it is possible to depart temporarily from
monetary targets if the underlying relationships appear to have changed, it
is generally not possible to depart temporarily from exchange rate target
bands without there being a severe loss of credibility.
Specification of the inflation target
It is easy to say that the objective of monetary policy is price stability.  It is
much harder to specify what that means in terms of observable quantities.A number of decisions need to be made in setting an inflation target.  They
include:
(a) What price index, and at what level should the target be set?
(b) Should there be a target band, and if so, how wide should it be?
(a) What price index, and at what level should the target be
set?
The measurement of inflation is an important subject in its own right,
irrespective of the choice of monetary policy technique.  The use of
inflation targets merely makes its importance more obvious.  Although
measurement issues may appear to be matters of detail, they nevertheless
raise some fundamental questions and I would like to discuss two of them.
(i) Current consumption or current plus future consumption?
The first question is about asset prices and monetary policy.  As a matter of
principle, should the chosen index represent the prices of goods and
services for immediate consumption only, or should it represent the price
of goods and services for both present and future consumption?  Alchian
and Klein (1973) argue that the proper objective of monetary policy should
be defined in terms of an index of present and future consumption, because
an index confined to goods and services for current consumption fails to
recognise the scope for inter-temporal substitution in consumption.  In
other words, according to Alchian and Klein, the price indices used for
monetary policy purposes should include not only prices of goods andservices for current consumption but also the prices of present claims over
future goods and services.
In practice, available consumer price indices are neither indices of prices of
goods and services for current consumption alone, nor are they price
indices of both goods and services for current consumption and present
claims over future consumption.  Of course they include prices of goods
and services for current consumption, but they also include prices of
consumer durables, which provide services for some period in the future,
until they wear out.  But available price indices do not include prices of
present claims over goods and services for future consumption other than
services provided by consumer durables which can be purchased now.
With few exceptions, markets for future goods and services do not exist,
and there is accordingly no possibility of producing a price index of the
kind which Alchian and Klein’s argument indicates would be desirable.
But the logic of the argument is compelling and, as Alchian and Klein note
(p176), “since assets are sources of future services, asset prices provide
clues to prices of present claims on future consumption”.  In other words,
the practical implication of Alchian and Klein’s argument is that monetary
policy should take account of asset prices as well as conventional price
indices.  Even so, asset prices need to be interpreted with care, as Alchian
and Klein point out.  For example a change in the price of an asset may be
caused simply by a re-evaluation of its likely \LHOG WKDWLVDUHHYDOXDWLRQ
of the quantity or quality of goods and services that the particular asset in
question is expected to produce in the future.  An asset price change causedin this way does not imply any change in the price of the generality of
present claims on future consumption.  Moreover it is important to
distinguish relative price changes among assets, and changes of the price of
goods and services for current consumption relative to the price of present
claims over future consumption, from changes in the general price level.
All these problems of interpretation are analogues of problems that arise in
the interpretation of conventional price indices.
It would be possible to arrive at the same conclusion for monetary policy
by way of a different route, not involving Alchian and Klein’s argument.
Suppose that monetary policy were concerned wholly with the prices of
goods and services for immediate consumption.  The rate of inflation of
those prices is not affected immediately by monetary policy actions:  there
is a time lag.  So monetary policy has to be concerned with managing the
future rate of inflation and has to be based on a forecast of what the future
rate of inflation will be.  That forecast will be influenced by the current
state of a wide range of economic variables, including asset prices.  In
other words, it is not difficult to justify the assertion that monetary policy
should take account of asset prices. Smets (1997) explores exactly how
monetary policy should react to asset price changes.
The practical importance of asset price developments for monetary policy
is illustrated by the experience of the “bubble economy” in Japan in the
late 1980s
4, though that is by no means the only relevant historical
illustration.  Inflation as measured by the consumer price index was low:
4 I am grateful to Mr Yutaka Yamaguchi of the Bank of Japan for provoking this thought.consumer price inflation was less than 4% throughout this period 1983–90,
but there were very large increases in share prices and land prices.  Share
prices nearly trebled between the end of 1985 and the market peak in 1989.
The commercial land price index for large cities peaked at more than
double its end-1985 level.  In other words, the prices of goods and services
for current consumption were fairly stable, but it was clear from the rises in
asset prices that, although the prices of present claims over goods and
services for future consumption could not be directly measured, they were
nevertheless rising very fast.  Monetary policy did not respond promptly to
rising asset prices;  indeed short-term interest rates fell in 1986 and 1987.
When monetary policy was tightened in 1989 and 1990, it had extremely
disruptive effects on asset markets and on the Japanese economy.  Equity
prices fell by more than 50% between 1989 and 1992;  and urban land
prices have been falling continuously since the peak for seven successive
years.  The fall in asset prices had very serious effects on the capital
position of Japanese commercial banks, which had lent heavily against the
collateral of assets whose values had fallen sharply.  As everyone knows,
the Japanese economy entered a period of stagnation from which it has still
not recovered.
It is now universally acknowledged that, with the benefit of hindsight, it
would have been preferable for monetary policy to have been tightened in
the late-1980s as asset prices rose, even though, according to conventional
indices, consumer price inflation was not excessive.  Narrow-minded
inflation targeting would not have been enough.(ii) Measurement problems
On most views, the ultimate objective of all economic activity is to produce
consumer satisfaction, and the ideal consumer price index would measure
the money cost of achieving a particular level of consumer satisfaction, or
utility [see Fisher and Shell (1972)].  Such an ideal index would be called a
cost-of-living index in the jargon.  Turning the economic concept into hard
numbers is fraught with difficulties, however.  The Retail Price Index in
the United Kingdom makes no claim to measure the cost of maintaining a
particular level of consumer satisfaction.  To quote the Retail Price Index
Advisory Committee (1986):
We wish to reaffirm the view taken by our predecessors that
the RPI is an index of price changes and not a “cost of living”
index.  It is not designed to measure the effect of changes in
the kinds, amounts and quality of the goods and services
people buy, or in the total amount which needs to be spent in
order to live.  Nor does it measure changes in the cost of
maintaining a particular level of consumer satisfaction.  The
RPI measures the overall change in prices by reference to the
cost of a “basket” of goods and services which in turn is
based on what households have actually spent their money
on, the contents of the basket being brought up to date at the
beginning of each year and then fixed for twelve months.  We
believe this to be the best practicable design for the index and
see no reason to try to change it.  However, we recognise thatmovements in retail prices must be an important factor in
determining the cost of living however this is defined.
Consumer price indices are, typically, fixed-weight averages of prices of
consumer goods and services.  The price data are obtained by regular
inquiries made by statistical offices at specified outlets (shops).  The
weights are based on the distribution by product of consumer expenditure
and are revised at regular intervals as the distribution of consumer
expenditure changes.
There are two main sources of imperfection, or bias, in measured inflation.
Substitution bias arises because consumers can be expected to switch
expenditure away from more expensive products towards cheaper products,
and away from more expensive outlets towards cheaper ones.  The purpose
of regular reviews of the weights in the index and of the selection of outlets
chosen for sampling purposes is to minimise substitution bias, but the bias
is likely to remain in the periods between regular reviews.  Cunningham
(1996) estimates that substitution bias in the retail price index in the UK
lies between 0.15% and 0.35% a year.  The product composition of the
retail price index in the United Kingdom is reviewed every year.  In other
countries reviews are less frequent, and in those countries substitution bias
might be expected to be larger than in the United Kingdom. The Boskin
Report (1996) estimates that, in the United States, substitution bias is 0.5%
a year.Problems caused by composition effects are more difficult.  They are of two
kinds.  Quality bias arises because the quality of goods and services within
a particular category may change, but the change may not be fully allowed
for in computing the price index.  If quality increases over time, failure to
allow for it fully will lead to overstatement of inflation.
New products raise more fundamental problems.  In principle, the
introduction of any new product widens consumer choice and makes it
possible to achieve a given level of utility at a cost which may be lower
than previously and will certainly be no higher.  In other words the
introduction of any new product has a neutral to negative effect on the true
cost of living index.
5
How large are quality bias and new product bias?  Cunningham provides
an estimate of 0.20–0.45% for the United Kingdom, and the Boskin Report
estimates 0.6% for the United States.  Personally, I think any estimate is
likely to be very unreliable.  As a matter of principle the effect on the true
cost of living index of the introduction of a new product depends on what
the new product is.  The introduction of a new brand of chocolate bar (if its
price is the same as that of other brands) probably makes a negligible
difference to the cost of achieving a given level of utility, because it is
likely to be a very close substitute for existing products.
5 Equally, the withdrawal of any existing product has a neutral to positive effect on the true cost of
living index.  As a matter of common observation, the process of economic growth has been
accompanied by proliferation of available products.New products which are not close substitutes for existing products perhaps
fall into two groups.  New products in the first group provide the same
service to the customer as the old product, but at a lower cost.  The
introduction of such products self-evidently reduces the cost of achieving a
given level of utility.  Conceptually it is straightforward to take account of
this kind of technological improvement in price measurement, though in
practice it is extremely difficult.  Nordhaus (1997) shows how
technological improvements have reduced the cost of lighting services in
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries;  he also reaches the remarkable
conclusion that traditionally-constructed price indices would exaggerate
the rate of inflation of the price of lighting services over the period since
1800 by an average of 3.6% per annum.  Shapiro and Wilcox (1996)
examine the price of treatment for eye cataracts during a period of
technological improvement.
The second group consists of new products which provide services which
were previously unavailable.  Treatment of such products in price indices is
very difficult in concept, let alone in practice.  A good example is the
introduction of pharmaceutical products which can improve the quality of
life of people suffering from particular diseases or ailments.  The
introduction of such products can make an enormous difference to the cost
to those people of achieving a given level of utility.  Their existence also
reassures non-sufferers that if they contract the disease or ailment it can be
treated.  Such products are by no means close substitutes for existing
products.Real life price indices make no allowance for new products in the second
group .  Nor could they.  If they were to allow properly for such products,
producers of statistics would need to know the elasticity of substitution in
demand between new products and existing ones.  Estimates of the
elasticity could be obtained only after there had been time to analyse the
demand for the new product in the light of experience, and the resulting
price index would by then be well out of date.  One approach to estimating
the true rate of inflation - the rate of inflation of the ideal cost-of-living
index- could be to estimate an average amount of bias in conventionally
measured inflation, and adjust the conventional index to allow for it.  The
Boskin Report provides a central estimate of 1.1%  year for the bias in
measured consumer price inflation in the United States.  Cunningham’s
estimate for the bias in measured inflation in the United Kingdom is 0.35–
0.80%.  However, as I have already said (and as the authors acknowledge),
I think that the accuracy of any estimate is extremely doubtful;  and
moreover there is no reason to think that the degree of bias will be constant
over time.
It seems inevitable, therefore, that monetary policy will have to continue to
be conducted, and inflation targets set, by reference to estimated price
indexes which fall short of the conceptual ideal.  This is perhaps a
disappointing conclusion, but it is not catastrophic:  there have been
periods in history (for example the period 1945–70 in most industrial
countries) when monetary management was very successful, according to
present-day reckoning, despite the absence of ideal cost-of-living indices.
Nor does it make nonsense of inflation targeting.  The objective ofmonetary policy is price stability.  Although finding a precise numerical
definition of price stability is not easy, because of the measurement
problems I have described, it is nevertheless possible to achieve an
approximation to price stability which most people will find acceptable.
Measurement problems make it difficult to choose the level of the inflation
target.  If it were known with certainty that the chosen price index
overstated inflation by X% a year, then it would be natural to set an
inflation target of X%, so that the target for “true cost of living inflation”
was zero.  In fact there is no such certainty and there is some degree of
inescapable arbitrariness in the setting of inflation targets.
If the initial rate of inflation is much higher than the desirable long-run
target, then it may be optimal to set targets which provide for a gradual
reduction in inflation to the long-run target.  In setting such targets, a trade-
off has to be struck between the cost of having inflation above the
desirable long-run target level (which is reduced if disinflation is faster)
and the cost of fluctuations in output during the disinflation process (which
is increased if disinflation is faster).
(b) Should there be a target band, and if so, how wide should it
be?
The purpose of an inflation target is to provide the central bank with a rule
for making monetary policy decisions.  For that purpose, a target band is
not necessary:  a single point target is sufficient.  Why in that case would it
be desirable to specify a band rather than a single point target, and howwide should such a band be?  There are two possible reasons for specifying
a band.
(i) As a promise and a monitoring device.  It is obvious that it will not be
possible to hit a single point target for the rate of inflation continuously,
because economic behaviour and economic developments are not
completely predictable.  A target band for inflation can represent an
acknowledgment of that fact, and a promise that the central bank will keep
inflation within the band.  At the same time, it can represent a monitoring
device, because the central bank will clearly be perceived to have failed if
inflation strays outside the band.  Obviously if a band is introduced for this
purpose, its width will depend on how far the variability of the rate of
inflation can be reduced.
(ii) As a means of introducing flexibility into monetary policy.  A target
band for monetary policy gives the central bank some discretion over
which point in the band it aims for in making monetary policy
GHFLVLRQV IRU H[DPSOH DOORZLQJ LW WR DFFRPPRGDWH VRPH F\FOLFDO
variation in the rate of inflation.  The width of a band introduced for this
purpose would depend on how much discretion was required.
In the United Kingdom, we have a single point target. The need for
monitoring and accountability is met by a requirement that if inflation
departs from the target of 2½%
6 by 1% or more, on either side, then the
6 The target is defined as the twelve month change in retail prices excluding mortgage interest
repayments (RPIX).Governor of the Bank of England must write an open letter to the
Chancellor of the Exchequer explaining why the discrepancy has occurred,
how long it is likely to persist, and how the Monetary Policy Committee
intends to bring inflation back to target.  The inflation target makes no
explicit allowance for accommodating cyclical variation in the rate of
inflation.  The Government can re-set the target each year and could in
principle adjust it in parallel with business cycle developments, but such a
pattern of adjustment would probably increase the amplitude of cyclical
fluctuations in output and is therefore not very likely to be adopted.
Forecasting
I mentioned earlier that inflation targeting depends on two WKLQJV ILUVWD
forecast of how inflation will develop assuming that monetary policy is
unchanged;  and second an estimate of how future inflation is likely to be
affected by a change in the current setting of monetary policy instruments.
In fact, any monetary policy technique depends on forecasting, because
monetary policy actions do not have all their effects immediately:  some of
the effects are long-delayed.
Everyone knows how difficult forecasting is, and it is no easier for the
Bank of England than for anyone else.  Everyone also knows that it
requires both economic models and judgement about how economic
behaviour and relationships are likely to differ in the future from what has
been observed in the past.  I should like to describe four devices that the
Bank of England has adopted to improve the accuracy and usefulness of its
forecasts.(i) We long ago abandoned our large econometric model.  Large models
tend to have properties which are sensitive to small changes in
specification.  Because they are so large, their fundamental structures
are difficult to understand and very hard to change.  They tend to
obstruct thinking about the economy, rather than making it easier.
Instead we use small models which are easier to understand and to
adapt in case of need.  Of course, there is a central small model which
in a mechanical sense produces the forecasts that we publish.  But we
use other small models to inform our judgements on particular issues,
which will be reflected in the adjustments we make to the central model
for forecasting purposes.  For example, we have used separate models
to estimate the likely effects of the national minimum wage which is to
be introduced in the United Kingdom next year.  Whitley (1997)
discusses the use of economic models in forecasting and policy making.
Price (1996) discusses the relationship between models and judgement
in central bank economic analysis.
(ii) We have explicitly recognised the uncertainty surrounding economic
forecasts.  The forecasts embody probability distributions of future
values of economic variables.  We illustrate the distribution in the so-
called fan chart (Chart 2).  In the fan chart, the central band includes the
central  SURMHFWLRQ LQ RWKHU ZRUGV WKH RXWFRPH MXGJHG PRVW OLNHO\
There is judged to be a 10% probability that inflation will be in the
central band at any date.  The next deepest bands, on either side, take
the distribution out to 20%, and so on in steps of 10 percentage points.Chart 2
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The chart shows the relative likelihood of
possible outcomes. The central band
includes the central projection: there is
judged to be a 10% chance that inflation
will be within that central band at any
date.  The next deepest shade, on both
side of the central band, takes the
distribution out to 20%;  and so on, in
steps of 10 percentage points.  Of course,
it is impossible to assess the probabilities
with any precision, but this represents the
Monetary Policy Committee’s best
estimate.  The more uncertainty there is
about the inflation outcome at any
particular time horizon, the wider the
bands, and the more gradually the
shading fades.  And if the risks are more
on one side than the other, then the
remaining bands will be wider on that
side of the central band.
Chart 3
Cross-sectional probability
distribution of RPIX inflation with
10% confidence bands
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(a) Taken from the February 1998 Bank
of England Quarterly Bulletin, page
34.
Another perspective is the cross-sectional probability density function
of inflation at a given future date (Chart 3).  The most likely outcome is
the peak of the distribution. Then to draw the bands, the following rulecan be used: Two points of equal probability density are shown, one on
each side of the mode.  The two points are then moved away from the
centre simultaneously, keeping their probability densities equal, until
there is 10% of the distribution in the single central band, with these
two points marking the outside edges. The two points are moved
outwards again on either side of the central band, still keeping their
probability densities equal, until another 10% of the distribution has
been added, this time marking a pair of bands, one on either side of the
centre.  These two bands are shaded the same colour as each other, but
are lighter than the central band.  Pairs of bands continue to be added
until 90% of the distribution is covered.  (There are no finite limits to
the assumed distribution, so the chart cannot cover 100% of it.)
The distribution need not be symmetric, and as you can see, particularly
in the cross-section, the example I have shown is not symmetric.  The
forecast can thus recognise that the risks to the forecast may be more
heavily weighted on one side or the other of the central projection (the
most likely outcome), and the balance of risks can be very important for
policy decisions.  Equally, the degree of uncertainty, as reflected in the
width of the distribution on both sides of the central projection, may
change, and that too could influence policy decisions.  Further
information is provided by Britton, Fisher and Whitley (1998).
(iii)The forecast - including the assessment of the risks - is produced with
the active involvement of the Monetary Policy Committee, who also
make decisions about interest rates.  Indeed, it is their forecast,although their views may not all be identical.  Their involvement
ensures that they review all the factors that are likely to influence
future inflation and assess them in a coherent framework.  That
objective would not be achieved if they passively took delivery of a
forecast produced by the staff.  Taking part in the forecasting process
is an essential input into the interest rate decision process.
(iv) The forecasts, which are produced quarterly, are published, alongside
an extensive analysis of current economic developments and a
description of the thinking underlying the forecast.  Moreover, we have
undertaken to publish the models that we use for forecasting purposes
by the end of this year.  This is consistent with the strategy of openness
in monetary policy which we have adopted.  It means that the
forecasts, and in future the models, can be scrutinised by experts
outside the central bank so that they can understand our thinking better
and suggest improvements to it.  The quality of public debate on
monetary policy in the United Kingdom has improved greatly in the
last few years, and I am convinced that official openness has been one
of the main reasons.
The horizon of the inflation target
At what time horizon should monetary policy aim to achieve the inflation
target?  Obviously the inflation target cannot be achieved continuously,
since inflation is subject to unpredictable shocks and monetary policy
operates with a lag, or time delay.  Equally obviously, it would not makesense to target inflation at a time horizon shorter than the minimum time
delay before monetary policy begins to affect inflation.
For example, suppose that the forecast shows that if interest rate policy is
unchanged, inflation will be above target in the first year of the forecast
period and below target in later years (ignoring forecast uncertainty for the
present).  How should monetary policy react?  If interest rate changes made
now begin to affect inflation only after a lag of a year or more, then it is too
late to prevent above target inflation in the first year of the forecast and
interest rates should be reduced so as to bring inflation in later years up to
target.  But suppose instead that interest rate changes made now begin to
affect inflation after a lag of six months.  Then there is an argument for
increasing interest rates now to bring inflation down towards the target in
the second half of the first year of the forecast.  But such an increase in
interest rates is likely to mean that inflation will be further below forecast
at the beginning of the second year of the forecast, and if the lag between
policy action and its effect on inflation is distributed over a period, rather
than being concentrated at a particular lag length, it will remain below
forecast for some period during the second year of the forecast.  The
central bank has to use interest rates to manage the path of inflation
relative to the inflation target, starting from the point in the future at which
monetary policy actions taken now begin to affect inflation.
In managing the path of inflation, the central bank will need to be
conscious of the likely path of output and may need to strike a trade-off
between deviations of inflation from target and variability of output.Suppose that there has been an adverse supply shock which causes
inflation to increase above target, and output to fall.  How quickly should
the central bank aim to bring inflation back to target?  The quicker the
disinflation, the shorter the period during which inflation is above target.
That is a benefit.  On the other hand, the quicker the disinflation, the
greater the potential fluctuation in output.  That is a cost.  Central banks
that are instructed to pursue inflation targets are implicitly obliged to make
trade-offs of this kind.  Research on the nature of the trade-offs is in
progress in the United Kingdom.  [See Batini and Haldane (1998).]
Openness and transparency
I have mentioned a couple of times the need when disinflating to strike
trade-offs between the cost of having inflation above target (which is
reduced if disinflation is faster) and the cost of output fluctuations (which
is increased if disinflation is faster).  The trade-off arises fundamentally
because it is assumed that to reduce inflation it is necessary to reduce
output temporarily.  However, the extent of the necessary reduction in
inflation depends crucially on the credibility of the commitment of the
inflation target.  The more credible the commitment, the lower the output
cost of reducing inflation.
Let me mention five devices which we now use in the United Kingdom to
promote openness and transparency.(a) The Bank of England publishes each quarter an Inflation Report, setting
out the Monetary Policy Committee’s analysis of recent economic
developments and a forecast of inflation and output growth over the
coming two years.
(b) The minutes of the monthly Monetary Policy Committee meetings are
published.  They give a full account of all the arguments put forward
both for and against the decision actually taken, and are extensively
reported and discussed in the press and in financial markets.
(c) Members of the Monetary Policy Committee are frequently questioned
by the Treasury Select Committee of the House of Commons.
(d) If the rate of inflation strays from the target by more than 1% on either
side, the Governor has to write an open letter to the Chancellor of the
Exchequer explaining how the discrepancy arose, how long it is
expected to persist, and what the Monetary Policy Committee intends to
do to correct it.
(e) Members of the Monetary Policy Committee make frequent speeches
about monetary policy in all parts of the country.  In addition, the Bank
employs regional Agents, located in different parts of the country,
whose job it is to maintain contact with local businesses and business
groups, gather information from them and explain the Bank’s policies
to audiences in their regions.Openness and transparency are very effective means of improving
credibility.  First, they make it possible for those responsible for monetary
policy to be publicly accountable for their decisions.  That increases their
incentive to achieve the inflation target, and it therefore increases the
public’s confidence that the inflation target will be hit.  Second, the
thought processes of those taking monetary policy decisions are more fully
exposed to the public.  That means that the public are able to comment on
official thinking, so that there can be a debate which may lead to improved
official thinking.  It also provides reassurance to the public that the central
bank is pursuing its stated objective and not some other objective which
has not been announced.  I think we have seen some of these benefits in the
United Kingdom.
Concluding remarks
Advocates of other intermediate targets promise to make monetary policy
easy.  Just keep the money supply on track, or just keep the exchange rate
pegged, they say, and all will be well.  Both in the UK and Korea,
however, experience shows that all is not always well.
Inflation targeting doesn’t promise to make monetary policy easy.  In a
sense, all it does is to specify the precise objective of monetary policy.  But
at least it doesn’t make any false promises, and it has the positive virtue of
directing attention to the many technical issues that need to be resolved in
conducting monetary policy.References
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